A few years ago, a group of the bunkertarian wing were
touting Somalias status as a "failed state" as proof that an ungoverned anarchy can exist in todays world, while more pragmatic minds such as myself and Jason Sorens, state that
the ongoing violence there argues against the present utility of an ancap state, at least in that part of the world. Those voices seem to have gone quiet recently, as it has become oh so evident that this "ungoverned state" has become prey to a Neo-Taliban, likely funded by the same Wahabbist fanatics that gave Bin Laden his start.
Leeson and Stringham attempt in their 2005 paper, "
Is Government Inevitable?", to dispute the claims by Randall Holcombe in "
Goverment: Unecessary but Inevitable" that anarchy is inherently impossible to maintain and thus libertarians should focus on establishing minarchist libertarian governments to preempt the inevitable attempt by the strong to force a less desirable government on the weak.
They argue firstly that just because a civilized anarchy has never existed (the handful of anarchic societies in recent history constitute the most primitive societies around living in generally undesirable marginal terrain), doesn't mean it is impossible any more than one could claim in 1500 AD that democracy was impossible because none had existed up to that day. This is fair, but simplistic: democracies did exist prior to 1500, so far back as ancient Greece, Sparta, and the Roman Republic. The most civilized society that was most minimalist in government was the medieval Icelanders, as David Friedman
has written of, and even they had their priests, their lay-judges and their Althing.
The arguments get weaker from there. They then try to posit that if it is inevitable for an anarchy to fail, as Holcombe claims, they argue that for the same reasons that an anarchy would fail, so would a weak minarchy fail.
He [Holcombe] maintains that stronger agents will be tempted to use force against the weak and impose government on them. Because some are stronger than others they will see that using force is cheaper than trade. While parts of the argument may have truth, they do not establish the inevitability of the state. To arrive at Holcombe’s conclusion, two special assumptions are necessary.
1. First, strength must be so disproportionate that the strong face little downside for engaging in conflict. This assumption may be unrealistic. Imagine what would happen if everyone were of similar strengths. If one stood a fifty percent chance of losing any fight, as long as fighting entails costs, the use of force would not be the income-maximizing strategy.
The problem with this simplistic assumption is that, even if you made the hypothetical assumption that all players started out exactly equal, such material equalities would rather quickly change to match the relative strengths and weakenesses of each unique individual. Some individuals would grow wealthy on their own productivity or skill in trade, while others would fall behind, as is the natural order of competition in the free market. Further, individuals readily group and coalition to gain an advantage over others, a condition repeatedly proven both in the real world every day, and particularly in the anarchic reality television show, "Survivor", and its clones, where we regularly see socially intelligent players building alliances to vote others "off the island", and tribes competing against one another for precious resources.
The relevant question is not whether some are more powerful than others but whether power is so lopsided that the strong face few risks by engaging in conflict. Consider again the state of global anarchy in which we find ourselves. Poer is more evenly distributed between sovereign states in the international arena than between individuals in New York’s Central Park....It is merely to point out that the presence of asymmetric power is insufficient to prove that world government is inevitable.
Firstly, it is improper to automatically assume that violent conflict is the only means to achieving lopsided power. Commerce and trade make inequality inevitable, and inevitably lead to assymetries of force in any plenum without an arms control regime. A more accurate elucidation would be whether potential gains of force outweigh the potential losses, versus the more mundane risks of peaceful trade.
In Central Park, one sees binary engagements: where generally one or both sides comprises a single individual with one life that the individual values highly, and so the risk of loss of life makes risk of engaging in conflict a totality, particularly when overpowered or outnumbered. While this makes victims less enthused about being victimised, it emboldens thugs to form alliances or become empowered by strength or weaponry. In the international arena, leaders rarely if ever are personally at risk and so feel less loss at engaging in conflict, but it is easier to purge a leader from office than to kill him or her. The fact that puny states such as Monaco and Andorra live peacefully next to much larger nations disproves Leeson and Stringham's assumptions here.
2. The second assumption required for Holcombe’s conclusion is that weaker individuals cannot find private solutions to transform the incentives of the strong to plunder.
There are of course many such solutions: private arms, voluntary militias. However, Leesom and Stringham choose some particularly bad examples.
Traveling middlemen who connected European exporters on the coast of Angola and the producers of these exports in the remote interior of Africa were substantially stronger than the producers with whom they interacted. Additionally, no formal authority policed the interactions between the members of these two groups—they interacted in the context of anarchy. Middlemen thus faced a strong incentive to violently steal the goods they desired rather than trading to obtain them.
The argument presented by Holcombe suggests that these middlemen would establish government over producers, but the historical record indicates that they did not.
Not so. Travelling traders such as described maintained their professions for their lifetimes. If they violently stole the producers goods every trip, the producers would in fact organize a government to prevent them, even to force the traders to pay higher rates for product. In fact, this has been historically the case, where feudalism arose to protect farmers and skilled tradesmen from roving exploiters. So, rather than establish government over the producers, the traders sought to maintain the state of anarchy in order to protect their own pocketbook against higher prices and punitive taxes of states organized by producers. This maintenance of a Nash equilibrium was stable only so long as more rapacious marauders did not compete for the same goods. Greater competition for more scarce goods would have resulted in force and conflict, and inevitably government.
Why? Producers devised several informal institutions for transforming the incentive of stronger middlemen from banditry to exchange. One institution they employed was middleman credit. Producers decided not to produce anything so that if middlemen came to plunder their goods, there would be nothing for them to steal. After having incurred a costly trip to the interior to plunder producers, middlemen who approached producers and found nothing to take faced two options. They could either go home empty handed, or they could agree to exchange with producers on credit.
Because the former choice involved certain losses and the latter involved the prospect for profits, middlemen agreed to credit agreements with producers. Middlemen would pay up front and producers would agree to harvest the goods and make them available at some point in the future. The use of credit not only prevented middlemen from plundering producers, it also created a strong incentive for them to protect these producers from the predatory behavior of other middlemen.
But isn't this an imposition of force by the producers on the trading middlemen? Isn't this establishing the middleman as an party interested in protecting "their producers" from other marauding middlemen, and thus, a Private Protection Agency, ergo a minimalist government? The producer has transformed the middleman into a public servant.
Furthermore, the sort of enlightened anarchy as L&S would have us believe is the situation is not stable. Middlemen could easily decide to collude against producers. Producers cannot simply not produce permanently, they must produce an excess for themselves to endure the dry season, or winter, as the case may be. Taking the surplus of an uppity producer or two merely creates free land for the middleman to sell to a younger son from some distance away, while "proving" the "inevitability" of working for "the man".
L&S then criticize Holcombe's assertion that a preemptive libertarian state will trump the formation of a thuggocracy, however as I describe above, with producers forming a local government to impose better prices on middlemen, how the trend toward government breaks depends on who is doing the breaking. L&S assume that any such preemptive government cannot be formed without political agents, that it takes some special class of person to form a state and maintain it, a full time specialization, however this claim is unsupported by many examples of minimalist government, from the small town meeting structure of 19th century New England (and still exists in many locales), to the Icelandic All-Thing, to the Folk-Moot, and other forms of seasonally convened voluntary government with a part-time constabulary organized under a militia structure.
Indeed, the militia structure and town meeting form of government is quite stable, going back to before the time of the Norman conquest to the time of the Danelaw in England, up to the present day in many locales. In England, the original structure was constituted by an elected Shire Reeve (aka Sheriff) who commanded all able bodied yeomen in the shire or county. Under him were constables, one for every 20 yeomen (a 'yeoman' being essentially a "Hey, Dude!", or general private individual, i.e. citizen). Town meetings evolved as meetings of the yeomen of the town, who selected their "select men", who were the constables.
While this structure is organically evolved, it has analogs in many other societies under different names and is generally universal, almost as much as the concept of the shaman. So, for this reason, L&S' assumption that a specialized class of political agents is necessary for government is quite false.
Then L&S really make a mistake,
Couple ruler self-interest with superior strength that Holcombe describes, and can there be any hope for limits on government? Rather than creating the minimal state as Holcombe desires, these political actors will deliver much more than anyone bargained for. If we agree with Holcombe that government is created by force, then why would we assume that its creators will produce the minimal state?
One way out this dilemma, to which Holcombe points, is if citizens are strongly unified against the will of the political agent. In this case the political agent will be forced to consider the desires of the public. But realize now that Holcombe is not relying on constitutional constraints as the main check on government but instead relying on ideology.
No, not really. Holcombe is relying on the self interest of the citizens multiplied by their greater numbers, and the fact that the 'agent' has to live among his neighbors. A greater problem is such an agent making a career of the use of force and convincing a bloc of yeomen that they can profit from the rest by supporting his tyrancy.
If one accepts the hypothesis that ideology can trump government force, anarchy becomes a sustainable socio-economic organization, which is just the opposite of what Holcombe wants to argue. Ideology, after all, is what libertarian anarchists such Hummel (1990; 2001) believe can stave off the violent formation of the state.
The problem with this assumption is based on the idea that an anarchical group in conflict cannot be beaten by a more well disciplined force of yeoman militia commanded by an officer corps, however part time it may be in its training. This assumption is inherently false.
The creation of preemptive limited government in Holcombe’s argument faces another serious problem. If we assume that stronger agents will always use strength to overtake the weak, what prevents stronger authoritarian states that devote most of their resources to military build up from overtaking societies with preemptively created limited governments?
That is a question answered by events such as the American Revolution.
Now, applying that to the present situation in Somalia, we have two main forces: a provisional government organized by the UN with little support from the warlords, and no effective authority outside the one city it is based in, versus the Islamist militia that gives warlords the option of joining or dying. The Islamists now control Mogadishu and other major cities, and are imposing Sharia upon a society that has over the past decade of anarchy imported a lot of western luxuries in exchange for the export of the khat drug to western nations. The UN allied government is now isolated from the sea, and will inevitably fall to the Islamist forces, whereupon a state will have been created out of an anarchy.
Going back to the first page of L&S' paper, where they state categorically, "Somalia is essentially stateless, and despite predictions that new government would immediately reemerge, has effectively remained so since its government dissolved in 1991. (Little, 2003)," we now see that their own assumption, that a decade of nongovernance constitutes a stable anarchy, is equally unsupportable.